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MAPP AFTER FORTY YEARS:
ITS IMPACT ON RACE IN AMERICA
Lewis R. Katzt
The facts in Mapp v. Ohio1 were not unusual. White plain-clothes
police officers, looking for a man suspected of bombing Don King's
home, surrounded Dollree Mapp's house, an African-American
woman known to the police, when the suspect's car was found parked
outside the house. They knocked on the door, but Mapp denied them
entrance without a search warrant. The officers radioed for a warrant,
but presumably without waiting for one, detectives accompanied by
six uniformed officers broke out the front glass of the door, entered,
and searched the house. The lead detective told her he had a warrant
and waved a piece of paper in her face, a paper which she allegedly
grabbed and stuffed in her blouse. After handcuffing Mapp, the offi-
cers retrieved the paper, but no warrant was offered at trial.2 While
the suspect was not found in the house, the officers found pencil
sketches of male and female nudes packed in a box and suitcase in
Mapp's bedroom. Mapp was charged with possession of obscene
materials, a felony. Even if there had been a warrant to search for the
suspected bomber, it would not have extended to a box and suitcase in
which he could not have been hiding.
The search without a warrant and without exigent circumstances
that might have excused the absence of a warrant violated the defen-
dant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures. At the time of the search, 1957, Ohio courts offered
1 John C. Hutchins Professor and Director, L.L.M. United States Legal Studies, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law. The author thanks Robert L. Wagner, J.D. 2001,
for his invaluable research assistance.
' 367 U.S. 643,643-45 (1961).
2 See State v. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Ohio 1960), rev'd Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961) ("No warrant was offered in evidence, there was no testimony as to who issued any
warrant or as to what any warrant contained, and the absence from evidence of any such warrant
is not explained or otherwise accounted for in the record."). See also Stanley Kent & Michael
von Glahn, Dollree Mapp v. State of Ohio, CLEV. MAG. LANDMARK L. SUPP. 36, 38 (Mar.
1998) ("In the 1970s, Delau [one of the detectives] admitted-contradicting his trial testi-
mony-that his lieutenant had only obtained an affidavit [not a warrant], which spelled out the
reasons for wanting to secure a warrant.").
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little protection to Fourth Amendment rights.3 Nine years earlier, the
United States Supreme Court had held that the Fourth Amendment
protections that applied to the federal government were also binding
upon the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.4 In federal
courts since 1914, the remedy for violation of Fourth Amendment
rights had been exclusion of the evidence from the prosecution's
case.5 However, the Court said that the states were not bound by that
rule.6 Ohio, and about two-thirds of the other states, had not adopted
at that time an exclusionary rule for constitutional violations under
their own constitutions. 7 Thus, in about two-thirds of the states, po-
lice were free to violate fundamental constitutional rights without
consequences. When reviewing the search in this case, the Ohio Su-
preme Court acknowledged the constitutional violation but stated that
this court has held that evidence obtained by an unlawful
search and seizure is admissible in a criminal prosecution....
[A]nd the Supreme Court of the United States has held that
the Constitution of the United States does not usually prevent
a state court from so holding.
Hence, we conclude that ... the due process clause of the
14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was
not violated by defendant's conviction, although that convic-
tion was based primarily upon the introduction in evidence of
3 See, e.g., State v. Lindway, 2 N.E.2d 490, 493 (Ohio 1936) ("It is well settled that the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution ... are directed exclusively
against the activities of the federal government and have no application to the various states and
their agencies.").
4 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), overruled in part by Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) ("The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-
which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit
in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through the Due
Process Clause.").
5 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) ("We therefore reach the conclu-
sion that the letters in question were taken from the house of the accused ... in direct violation
of the constitutional rights of the defendant;... there was involved.., a denial of the constitu-
tional rights of the accused, and that the court should have restored these letters to the ac-
cused."). See also Wolf, 338 U.S. at 28 ("In Weeks v. United States.... this Court held that in a
federal prosecution the Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence secured through an illegal
search and seizure. This ruling was made for the first time in 1914.").
6 See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 33 ("We hold, therefore, that in a prosecution in a State court for
a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by
an unreasonable search and seizure.").
7 See id. at 38 tbl.I (summarizing the position of the states regarding the Weeks doctrine
in 1949).
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books and pictures unlawfully seized during an unlawful
search of defendant's home.
8
The illegal entry of Mapp's house by the police was nothing ex-
traordinary; it was an everyday fact of life for blacks and other racial
minorities. Police throughout America were part of the machinery of
keeping blacks "in their place," ignoring constitutional guarantees
against unreasonable arrests and searches and those that barred use of
"third-degree" tactics when questioning suspects. 9 The Constitution
played little role in the relationship between blacks and the police,
and the black population had little power at the time to seek redress
through the political process.
The primary story running through the four hundred years of
American civilization is race-the ongoing story of white mistreat-
8 State v. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d 387, 389-90 (Ohio 1960), rev'd, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).
9 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). The Supreme Court reversed the con-
viction of the accused, a black man, who was found guilty and sentenced to death for murdering
a white man. The summary of the facts of the case outlines the brutal methods police often used
to extract confessions:
On that night one Dial, a deputy sheriff, accompanied by others, came to the home
of Ellington, one of the defendants, and requested him to accompany them to the
house of the deceased, and there a number of white men were gathered, who began
to accuse the defendant of the crime. Upon his denial they seized him, and with the
participation of the deputy they hanged him by a rope to the limb of a tree, and hav-
ing let him down, they hung him again, and when he was let down the second time,
and he still protested his innocence, he was tied to a tree and whipped, and still de-
clining to accede to the demands that he confess, he was finally released and he re-
turned with some difficulty to his home, suffering intense pain and agony.... A
day or two thereafter the said deputy, accompanied by another, returned to the home
of the said defendant and arrested him, and departed with the prisoner towards the
jail in an adjoining county, but went by a route which led into the State of Alabama;
and while on the way, in that State, the deputy stopped and again severely whipped
the defendant, declaring that he would continue the whipping until he confessed, and
the defendant then agreed to confess to such a statement as the deputy would dictate,
and he did so, after which he was delivered to jail.
The other two defendants, Ed Brown and Henry Shields, were also arrested
and taken to the same jail.... [Ithe same deputy, accompanied by a number of
white men, one of whom was also an officer, and by the jailer, came to the jail, and
the two last named defendants were made to strip and they were laid over chairs and
their backs were cut to pieces with a leather strap with buckles on it, and they were
likewise made by the said deputy definitely to understand that the whipping would
be continued unless and until they confessed, and not only confessed, but confessed
in every matter of detail as demanded by those present; and in this manner the de-
fendants confessed the crime, and as the whippings progressed and were repeated,
they changed or adjusted their confession in all particulars of detail so as to conform
to the demands of their torturers.
... The facts are not only undisputed, they are admitted, and admitted to have
been done by officers of the state, in conjunction with other participants, and all this
was definitely well known to everybody connected with the trial, and during the
trial, including the state's prosecuting attorney and the trial judge presiding.
Id. at 281-85 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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ment of other races-red, black, and yellow. The history of blacks
and whites in America is the tale of black enslavement, murder, and
rape, and later the legitimization of under-class citizenship with its
lingering legacies of slavery. This includes arbitrary deprivation of
the most basic human rights, including life itself, notwithstanding the
commitments of the post-Civil War amendments. At every stage of
the first two hundred and fifty years of the Republic, all three
branches of the federal government were, at the least, accomplices to
these policies. The framers legitimized human slavery and chose to
reward the slave states. Even the (delayed) ban on importation of
slaves enriched slave holders by increasing the value of their slaves, 10
and the three-fifths rule increased the slave states' power in the new
Republic." Congress, traditionally, was the power base in the na-
tional government of the southern interests, except during the short
period of Reconstruction when the Radical Republicans held sway.1
2
Using the strangle-hold of seniority and the filibuster in the Senate,
southern representatives to the House and Senate into the mid-
twentieth century made sure that legislation seeking relief from injus-
tices for blacks rarely made it to the floor, and, if it did, they made
sure it died there. Although more than 4,700 Americans, the over-
whelming majority black, were lynched by mobs between the end of
the 1882 and 1968,"3 Congress never passed anti-lynching legislation.
Even after Brown v. Board of Education,14 in 1954, almost all of the
southerners in the United States Senate and House of Representatives
issued a document, the Southern Manifesto, denouncing the Supreme
Court decision and calling for massive resistance. This indicated that
enlightenment was no closer to power in the South than it had been a
century earlier.15
Nor could the black population look to the White House for help.
In the years after the Civil War, President Hayes removed federal
troops from the former Confederate states. He effectively abandoned
10 See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 98-101 (4th ed. 1974) (dis-
cussing debates during the Constitutional Convention about the slave trade, its effect on the
value of existing slaves, and the ultimate compromise reached in Article I, Section 9 of the
Constitution).
1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be appor-
tioned among the several States ... according to their respective Numbers, which shall be de-
termined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons.... three fifths of all other Persons.").
12 See FRANKLIN, supra note 10, at 252-67 (discussing the rise and eventual fall in politi-
cal power of the Radical Republicans just after the Civil War).
13 See JAMES ALLEN ET AL., WITHOUT SANCruARY: LYNCHING PHOTOGRAPHY IN AMER-
ICA 12 (2000).
14 347 U.S. 483,500 (1954).
15 See 102 CONG. REC. 4460-61, 4515-16 (1956) (showing that only Senators Albert
Gore, Sr. and Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, and Lyndon Baines Johnson of Texas did not sign
the Manifesto).
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the African-American population in those states to reactionary forces,
which recreated slavery in everything but name.16 President Franklin
D. Roosevelt was so timid when it came to race that he would not
even support anti-lynching legislation in Congress for fear of alienat-
ing the powerful southern congressional leadership. 17
In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court added its imprima-
tur to white supremacy. In Dred Scott v. Sanford,"8 the Court held
that a Negro "whose ancestors were imported into this country, and
sold as slaves," even when emancipated, could not be a citizen of the
United States and was not entitled to the privileges of citizenship, in-
cluding access to the courts to sue to protect his freedom.' 9 Forty
years later, the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson2° endorsed Jim
Crow laws and the separation of the races, which stood as a bar to
equality for half a century more.
Finally, at the mid-point of the last century, the black population
found a branch of the federal government willing to consider its is-
sues. The Supreme Court, under the stewardship of Chief Justice Earl
Warren, set out to eliminate the legal structure that perpetuated apart-
heid in America. While at the outset the Court did not have the sup-
port of the other branches of the federal government, World War 11
had a remarkable effect upon the American public. The Court's ini-
tial statements on fairness and equality found support from a substan-
tial percentage of the American public, except in the South and in the
southern leadership in the Congress.
When it comes to cases that stamp the Warren Court era, all deal
directly or indirectly with race. Brown v. Board of Education2 ' im-
posed the racial equality principle upon our society and, once and for
all, eliminated the legal basis for racial segregation. Baker v. Carr22
furthered equality in our representative democracy. Mapp v. Ohio23
stands out as the third hallmark case, beginning the transformation of
the constitutional ideal of due process into a living reality and leading
the way for the transformation of due process that followed. Justice
Walter V. Schaefer of the llinois Supreme Court described Brown,
16 See FRANKLIN, supra note 10, at 267 (discussing the presidential campaign of 1876 and
the compromise reached between the Republicans and Democrats regarding federal troops in the
South).
17 See T.H. WATKINS, THE HUNGRY YEARS 498-99 (1999) (discussing the attempts by
some members of Congress to pass an anti-lynching bill and its ultimate failure due to a filibus-
ter by southern senators).
's 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
'9 Id. at403.
20 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2' 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22 369 U.S. 186,237 (1962).
23 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
20011
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Baker, and the due process revolution initiated by Mapp as a process
of putting flesh and blood on our ideals.24
The Supreme Court procedure in Mapp, as well as the outcome,
provoked consternation and disagreement. Although the defendant in
the state court had moved to suppress the evidence illegally seized as
a result of a warrantless entry of her home, the Ohio Supreme Court
reiterated its prior holding that "evidence obtained by an unlawful
search and seizure is admissible in a criminal prosecution."5 United
States Supreme Court precedent supported that holding. In Wolf v.
Colorado,26 the Supreme Court held that an illegal search and seizure
violated a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, but the federal rule
27
requiring exclusion of such evidence was inapplicable to the states.
In just twelve years, state support for the proposition of law advanced
in Wolf had eroded. The national trend, evidenced by state court de-
cisions, was toward rejection of Wolf and adoption of the exclusion-
ary rule as a matter of state law. 28 A dissenting justice of the Ohio
Supreme Court indicated that state courts were "now about evenly
divided," which evidenced a sea change in the twelve years since the
Wolf decision.29
How the United States Supreme Court came to decide the Fourth
Amendment issue has long been an issue of contention and lore in
Cleveland legal circles. Judge Jack Day, in this Symposium, tells us
how the issue made it to the Supreme Court as a side issue in the
ACLU's amicus brief.30  The Justices themselves disagreed as to
whether the issue had been properly raised.
The majority conceded that the appellant "chose to urge what
may have appeared to be the surer ground for favorable disposition
and did not insist that Wolf be overruled," and that it was the amicus
24 See Walter V. Schaefer, Panelists' Comments, 54 KY. L.J. 521 (1966). Responding
during a symposium on poverty, equality, and the administration of criminal justice, Justice
Schaefer commented that:
Flesh and blood are being put on our ideals. This is true, for example, with respect
to Brown v. Board of Education. This is true with respect to Baker v. Carr, and is
true in all areas of criminal procedure. And putting flesh and blood-coming face-
to-face with our ideals and looking them in the teeth-is not always a comfortable
process, nor is it always an easy one.
ld. d State v. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Ohio 1960), rev'd, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
26 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
27 See id, at 33.
28 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961) ("While in 1949.... almost two-thirds of
the States were opposed to the use of the exclusionary rule, now, despite the Wolf case, more
than half of those since passing upon it, by their own legislative or judicial decision, have
wholly or partly adopted or adhered to the Weeks rule.").
Mapp, 166 N.E.2d at 394 (Herbert, J., dissenting).
30 See Jack Day, Words That Counted-A Vignette, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 373 (2001).
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curiae who urged the Court to overrule Wolf.31 That "surer" argument
was a request that the Court declare the Ohio obscenity statute, under
which Dollree Mapp had been charged and convicted, unconstitu-
tional. 32  The majority said the issue was initially raised in the Su-
preme Court by the ACLU's amicus brief. While that is true, dissent-
ing Justice Harlan pointed out that the issue was raised in the ACLU's
brief "in one short concluding paragraph of its argument 're-
quest[ing]' the Court to re-examine and overrule Wolf, but without
argumentation." 33 He further pointed out that Mapp's attorney raised
the question as a subordinate issue, not even citing to Wolf, and in
oral arument "expressly disavowed" any purpose to have Wolf over-
ruled. Justice Harlan's purpose was to demonstrate how the Court
had violated its own long-held principles in reaching out to decide an
issue that the parties had not focused upon.
35
The exclusionary rule seems to have that effect upon the United
States Supreme Court. Twenty years after Mapp, when the Rehnquist
Court was looking to emasculate the exclusionary rule, the Court
reached out in Illinois v. Gates.3 6 After oral argument in Illinois v.
Gates, the Court restored the case to its docket for the following term
and ordered the parties to brief and argue whether the exclusionary
rule should be modified, an issue that had never been raised by either
party in the life of the case. It was only after both parties returned
and argued the following year that any modification to the exclusion-
ary rule would be irrelevant to their case that the Court, "with apolo-
gies to all," relented and reserved the issue for another day.37 That
31 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 646 n.3.
32 See id. at 672-73.
33 Id. at 674 n.5 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
3 See id. at n.6.
35 See iL at 674-75 ("In this posture of things, I think it fair to say that five members of
this Court have simply 'reached out' to overrule Wolf. With all respect for the views of the
majority... I can perceive no justification for regarding this case as an appropriate occasion for
re-examining Wolf.").
36 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
37 See id. at 217. In the beginning paragraphs of the opinion, Justice Rehnquist outlined
the procedural history of the case.
We granted certiorari to consider the application of the Fourth Amendment to
a magistrate's issuance of a search warrant on the basis of a partially corroborated
anonymous informant's tip. After receiving briefs and hearing oral argument on this
question, however, we requested the parties to address an additional question:
"[W]hether the rule requiring the exclusion at a criminal trial of evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, should to any extent be
modified, so as, for example, not to require the exclusion of evidence ob-
tained in the reasonable belief that the search and seizure at issue was
consistent with the Fourth Amendment."
We decide today, with apologies to all, that the issue we framed for the par-
ties was not presented to the Illinois courts and, accordingly, do not address it.
Rather, we consider the question originally presented in the petition for certiorari,
2001]
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day came one week later, when the Court docketed three cases for its
1983-84 Term in which the proposed modification had been urged at
trial and argued on appeal. Two of those cases were decided a year
later, inaugurating the so-called "good faith" exception to the exclu-
sionary rule.38
With the decision in Mapp and the application of the exclusionary
rule to the states, the due process revolution and its reshaping of
American criminal justice was off to the races. Mapp led the way
when it held that the Fourth Amendment right "is enforceable against
[the states] . . . by the same sanction . . . as is used against the
[f]ederal [g]overnment. ' '39 Justice Clark's rationale for enforcing the
core right against the states the same way it was enforced against the
federal government became the rule as other core rights contained in
the Bill of Rights were made applicable to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the as-
surance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures
would be "a form of words," valueless and undeserving of
mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties,
so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of
privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of
coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as
a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
and conclude that the Illinois Supreme Court read the requirements of our Fourth
Amendment decisions too restrictively.
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
38 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) ("We conclude that the marginal
or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable
reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of
exclusion."); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (applying the good-faith excep-
tion created in Leon and reversing the exclusion of the evidence). The Sheppard Court con-
cluded:
In sum, the police conduct in this case clearly was objectively reasonable and
largely error-free. An error of constitutional dimensions may have been committed
with respect to the issuance of the warrant, but it was the judge, not the police offi-
cers, who made the critical mistake.... Suppressing evidence because the judge
failed to make all the necessary clerical corrections despite his assurances that such
changes would be made will not serve the deterrent function that the exclusionary
rule was designed to achieve. Accordingly, federal law does not require the exclu-
sion of the disputed evidence in this case.
Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 990-91. A third case, Colorado v. Quintero, 463 U.S. 1206 (1983),
raised the issue of whether a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should be ap-
plied to searches conducted without warrants. Quintero died before the case was argued,
mooting the case, and the specific issue has never been addressed by the Supreme Court.
39 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
40 id.
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This universal rule was restated in another Clark majority opinion
two years later.4 ' It was stated that the right, once applied to the
states, would be interpreted by "the same constitutional standard" as
used in interpreting the federal right.42
This became the standard as Mapp led the way when making
other rights of the Bill of Rights binding on the states. By the end of
the Warren Court, almost all of the protections of the Bill of Rights
applying to criminal cases had been made binding on the states, the
only exception being the Fifth Amendment protection guaranteeing
the initiation of criminal proceedings by grand jury indictment. Fol-
lowing closely on Mapp, the Court made the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination, 43 the Sixth Amendment rights to
counsel,44 to a speedy and public trial,45 to confrontation of hostile
witnesses,46 and to compulsory process to obtain witness testimony,47
and the Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive bail4 ap-
plicable to the states. Finally, the Warren Court incorporated the
double jeopardy prohibition into the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause,49 overruling Palko v. Connecticut,50 where the incor-
poration debate had begun. These rights came over to state criminal
proceedings through the Fourteenth Amendment to be enforced the
same as they would in federal criminal cases.
The road since Mapp has been strewn with obstacles and road-
blocks. The subsequent forty years is filled with the Court's devel-
opment of limitations on Mapp. The exclusionary rule is inapplicable
to grand jury proceedings,5' most sentencings as well as parole and
probation revocation proceedings, 52 collateral IRS proceedings fol-
lowing upon state criminal cases,53 and deportation hearings.54 Two
crippling limitations followed. In Stone v. Powell,55 the Supreme
41 See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
42 l at 30. See also id. at 33 ("This Court's long-established recognition that standards
of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment are not susceptible of Procrustean application is
carried forward when that Amendment's proscriptions are enforced against the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment.").
43 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
44 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S.
335,342 (1963).
45 See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213,223 (1967).
46 See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,403 (1965).
47 See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
48 See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357,365 (1971).
49 See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,794 (1969).
50 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
51 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974).
52 See Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998).
53 See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,454 (1976).
5 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984).
55 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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Court held that Fourth Amendment issues may not be raised in federal
habeas corpus actions if the defendant had a "full and fair opportu-
nity" to litigate the Fourth Amendment issue in the state criminal pro-
ceeding, even if the state courts incorrectly decided the Fourth
Amendment issue.56  That decision eliminated federal oversight of
state court decisions on Fourth Amendment issues, except for certio-
rari petitions to the Supreme Court, which in the early years after
Mapp was so useful in persuading recalcitrant state courts to enforce
Fourth Amendment rights. Finally, in 1984, the Supreme Court
adopted the so-called "good faith" exception, holding that the exclu-
sionary rule is inapplicable to searches where police in good faith rea-
sonably rely upon an invalid search warrant.57 All of these decisions
are based upon the premise that the exclusionary rule is not a consti-
tutional right, and that the singular reason for the exclusionary rule is
to deter illegal police behavior. This premise, however, rejects the
underlying rationale of both Weeks v. United States and Mapp v.
Ohio, namely that the exclusionary rule is part and parcel of the
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.51
I. MAPP AND THE MESSAGE
Notwithstanding the limitations imposed upon the exclusionary
rule in the ensuing years, the spirit of the Mapp decision continues to
come through loud and clear. Mapp's message is that the government
must obey the law while enforcing it. If the government fails to do
so, and in so doing violates the rights of citizens to be free from un-
reasonable searches and seizures, this violation will result in denying
the government the use of the fruits of its illegality to prove that the
citizen has committed a crime. This commitment involves making
unavailable, at least in the prosecution's case in chief, reliable evi-
dence of guilt. It results in a collateral issue-the conduct of the gov-
ernment in obtaining the evidence of guilt-taking precedence over
56 Id. at 494-95.
57 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468
U.S. 981,990-91 (1984).58 Compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (holding "that the exclusionary rule
is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments"), and Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 394 (1914) (noting that to sanction the unlawful invasion by officers of the
law of a person's home "would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an
open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people
against such unauthorized action"), with Stone, 428 U.S. at 486 ("The primary justification for
the exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment
rights. Post-Mapp decisions have established that the rule is not a personal constitutional
right."), and United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) ("[Tjhe [exclusionary] rule is
a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through
its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.").
[Vol. 52.471
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the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 59 In so doing, it sends an im-
portant message: We place greater value on ensuring that the gov-
ernment does not violate the fundamental rights of its citizens than we
do on convicting the guilty defendant in those cases where the evi-
dence is the result of a Fourth Amendment violation.
Every time a motion to suppress based upon a Fourth Amendment
violation is filed in a criminal case, the stage is set for retesting that
commitment to protecting individual rights and the social value of
holding the government to a high standard even if a guilty defendant
goes free. That is often the case when evidence is suppressed. There
is a tremendous cost when a guilty defendant goes free, and society's
willingness to absorb that cost constantly waivers. It is this cost that
has rallied opponents to the exclusionary rule for decades.
There are limits to the effects of the message. The exclusionary
rule only works in those cases where police are concerned that evi-
dence discovered during an intrusion will be available at a subsequent
trial. If there is no concern about the use of evidence, then the exclu-
sionary rule will have no deterrent effect upon police. For example, if
a police stop is designed to harass an individual or a member of a
group, the officer will not be concerned about a subsequent determi-
nation that the stop or arrest was illegal. Worse are those situations
where a police officer is willing to commit perjury at a suppression
hearing about the circumstances surrounding a stop, arrest, or search.
The existence of an exclusionary rule is meaningless to the perjuring
officer because she will manufacture facts to bring herself within the
law's requirements. Further, the message is lost when trial judges
deny motions to suppress pro forma regardless of the facts.
Despite the limitations on the message imposed by the limits on
the exclusionary rule set by the Supreme Court, the perjurious testi-
mony of certain police officers, and the failure of some trial judges to
enforce the Constitution as they have sworn, to do, the exclusionary
rule survives and has helped to strengthen the American people's
view of themselves as free citizens in a free society. The self-
confidence that comes with the knowledge that there are limitations
on how government may behave strengthens individual security and
invigorates individual willingness to take risks. The absence of self-
confidence causes individuals to withdraw from society and to wrap
themselves in a cocoon to maintain security and privacy, leading to a
very limited life. The greatest threats to privacy and self-confidence
today come from government and industry use of technology, which
59 Cf People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) ("The criminal is to go free be-
cause'the constable has blundered.").
20011
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
invades privacy and provides information on the most private aspects
of one's life. Somehow, the message of Mapp will have to be rein-
vigorated to limit government acquisition and use of such data; pro-
tection from private invasion of informational privacy will require
legislative action.6°
II. MAPP AND RACE
The impact of Mapp was naturally greatest in the African-
American community where Fourth Amendment violations were the
most common. Whatever limited effect Mapp would have, it would
be felt most where police conduct was the least restrained. It was this
community which the Warren Court intended to benefit by the due
process revolution, because wherever injustice existed in America, its
worst impact was felt in the black community.
The Mapp decision went hand-in-hand with Brown v. Board of
Education and other decisions of the Warren Court seeking to elimi-
nate legal barriers to racial justice. In Brown it was the laws that
mandated racial segregation; in Mapp it was the underlying law en-
forcement culture in the country that tolerated and encouraged police
to treat African-Americans and other racial minorities differently
from the majority population. And different meant worse. The police
were not unique in this regard; they were part of the racist culture that
permeated American life and that has not yet disappeared. The im-
pact of the racist culture on relations between police and African-
Americans is readily apparent throughout American history. The
white police officers who invaded Dollree Mapp's home did so with
confidence that they would not be called to task for violating her fun-
damental rights by entering her home without a warrant. How the
police behaved in Doliree Mapp's house was consistent with histori-
cal practice in the United States.
Since before the founding of the Republic, law enforcement offi-
cers were used primarily to track the movements of African-
Americans and to ensure their subservience. Prior to the Civil War, it
mattered little whether the African-American was a slave or a free-
man. Sheriffs and other law enforcement officers treated them the
same, thereby reducing the Negro freeman to slave status in the eyes
of the law. The Civil War changed little in that regard. In the South,
after Reconstruction precipitously ended, sheriffs and their deputies,
as well as police in the cities, were the instrument of repression,
60 The Fourth Amendment only protects against governmental intrusions of privacy, not
private intrusions of privacy. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) ("The
Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in the
previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action.").
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working hand-in-hand with nightriders who would keep the African-
American population terrorized and subservient. Police failed to pre-
vent lynchings or apprehend the perpetrators.
Even in the North, the African-American population received
very different justice on the street than whites. While relations be-
tween police and all citizens on the street during the first six decades
of the twentieth century were rough and characterized by arbitrary
overreaching by police, the full brunt of police lawlessness and
brutality fell on the African-American community. Arbitrarily
stopping and detaining African-Americans, 61 engaging in dragnet
arrests of African-Americans, 62 and, as in the Mapp case, entering
homes without warrants, police ensured that African-Americans were
second-class citizens, receiving rougher justice than that accorded the
rest of the population. Police brutality towards African-Americans
was as common in the North as in the South. And the criminal justice
system, then as now, meted out disproportionately harsher penalties to
African-American defendants than it did to white defendants.
63
The Warren Court's due process revolution sought to achieve a
more level playing field in state criminal proceedings by applying the
procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights to state criminal cases.
Mapp also sought to achieve justice on the streets by imposing the
exclusionary rule on state criminal proceedings to discourage police
from violating Fourth Amendment rights.
Whatever effect Mapp may have had on the streets immediately
after 1961, that effect was, at the very least, diminished after 1968. In
1968, the same Warren Court, in Terry v. Ohio,64 reacting to growing
national concern about increases in crime, sanctioned seizures of the
person on less than probable cause required for arrest. The Terry in-
vestigative stop requires a lesser standard than probable cause,
61 See David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While
Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REv. 265, 266 (1999) (discussing the police practice of arbitrarily
stopping and detaining African-American motorists simply because of their race).
62 See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 722 (1969) (noting that in investigating a rape
where the victim could only describe her assailant as a "Negro youth," the police, without war-
rants, rounded up at least twenty-four African-American youths and took them to police head-
quarters for questioning and fingerprinting before releasing them without filing charges).
63 See Harris, supra note 61, at 297-304 (discussing the disproportionate effect of the
criminal justice system on blacks); Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Racial Disparities in Sentencing: Can
Sentencing Reforms Reduce Discrimination in Punishment?, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 781, 802-07
(1993) (detailing a statistical analysis of sentencing disparities based upon race and recommend-
ing changes in mandatory sentencing schemes); Laura A. Wytsma, Comment, Punishment for
"Just Us"--A Constitutional Analysis of the Crack Cocaine Sentencing Statutes, 3 GEO. MA-
SON INDEPENDENT L. REv. 473, 496 (1995) (discussing the disparate treatment of mandatory
crack and powder cocaine sentences).64 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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namely reasonable suspicion, to justify an investigative detention. 65
Moreover, in the hands of a Supreme Court less sensitive to minority
concerns during the subsequent thirty years, the Terry stop, which the
Warren Court acknowledged is a Fourth Amendment seizure,66 grew
in its impact on the African-American community. The area in which
a stop takes place, such as a "high-crime area," became a factor in
determining the reasonableness of a stop, thereby making inner-city
residents far more subject to these stops than other citizens. 67 While
race is not a constitutionally acceptable factor in determining reason-
ableness, and thus the legitimacy of the investigative stop, "high
crime area" often is a euphemism for race, legitimizing race as a con-
sideration.
No one knows, for certain, whether the decision in Terry repre-
sented a loss of courage and commitment by the Warren Court to
equal justice on the streets. These stops, though illegal, were com-
mon prior to the Court's decision in Terry.68 The Court may have
legitimized them in order to get control by putting them within the
framework of the Fourth Amendment. However, the cost of provid-
ing this tool to help law enforcement prevent crime has grown over
the years. The momentary detention allowed and envisaged by Chief
Justice Warren in Terry has grown under the Burger and Rehnquist
6 After reviewing the underlying justifications of the Fourth Amendment and the needs of
the police, the Supreme Court held that:
Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this type of case
leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a rea-
sonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has rea-
son to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless
of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer
need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that
his safety or that of others was in danger. And in determining whether the officer
acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his incho-
ate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," but to the specific reasonable infer-
ences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.
Id. at 27 (citations omitted).
6 See id. at 16 ("There is some suggestion in the use of such terms as 'stop' and 'frisk'
that such police conduct is outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment because neither action
rises to the level of 'search' or 'seizure' within the meaning of the Constitution. We emphati-
cally reject this notion.").
67 See State v. Bobo, 524 N.E.2d 489, 493-94 (Ohio 1988) (Wright, J., dissenting) ("In
every metropolitan area in this nation, there are neighborhoods where illegal drug sales run
rampant and many of the residents are armed and ready for trouble.... I cannot see how we
can create what amounts to a 'high crime area' exception to the protections extended by the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.").
68 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 15 n.l 1 (noting that the practice of stopping and frisking, while
varying from locale to locale, exacerbates police-community tensions).
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Courts to allow for longer detentions and the use of substantial force
absent probable cause to justify a full-fledged arrest.69
Worse, the later Courts narrowed the category of Terry-stop by
expanding another category, "consensual encounters" between police
and citizens, which implicate no Fourth Amendment rights and, thus,
provide for no Fourth Amendment oversight of the reasonableness of
the police conduct.70 The "consensual encounter" is predicated upon
the Supreme Court's conclusion that no reasonable innocent person
would believe that he is not free to leave rather than comply with a
police officer's request that the person stop and provide information,
even though it is patently obvious that no reasonable innocent person,
not schooled in the fine points of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
would feel free to disregard a police officer under most of these cir-
cumstances. 71 It is little wonder, then, that issues such as racial pro-
filing have reached the political radar. Racial profiling by police 72 is
an issue that actually predates the founding of the Republic, 73 but it
has become such a wide-spread negation of basic Fourth Amendment
rights that its existence imperils not only the people who are subject
to such interference because of race or ethnicity but the liberty of all
Americans. If the nation continues to disregard, and thus ratify, this
injustice, it raises questions about the security of all Americans from
unreasonable searches and seizures.
By controlling movement, you control behavior. Mapp essen-
tialy protects freedom of movement from unreasonable interference
by police. By making unreasonable interference with the movement
69 See LEwis R. KATZ, OHIO ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 15.6 (2000) (discussing
the length and duration of a Terry detention).
70 See Florida v. Rodriquez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1984) ("The initial contact between the
officers and respondent, where they simply asked if he would step aside and talk with them, was
clearly the sort of consensual encounter that implicates no Fourth Amendment interest.");
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 544 (1980) ("As long as the person to whom ques-
tions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion
upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some particular-
ized and objective justification.").
71 See United States v. Notorianni, 729 F.2d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1984) (Cudahy, J., dissent-
ing) ("It is perfectly appropriate to indulge what may be a modest fiction that a person being
casually questioned by a policeman about possible criminal activity feels entirely free to say
nothing and move on.").
See Harris, supra note 61, at 270-73 (presenting three individual accounts and their
impact on the participants, the results of statistical analyses establishing the existence of racial
profiling, and the consequences of such a policy); Adero S. Jernigan, Student Article, Driving
While Black- Racial Profiling in America, 24 LAW & PSYCHOL REV. 127 (2000) (discussing
racial profiling and the Supreme Courtes decision in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806
(1996)).
73 See HERBERT S. KLEIN, SLAVERY IN THE AMERICAS 40-57 (1967) (chronicling the
history and the gradual shift to complete enslavement of the African-American population in
Virginia prior to the Revolutionary War); Jernigan, supra note 72, at 128-29 (reviewing the
history of police targeting of minorities in the United States since the 1600s).
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of African-Americans, like all Americans, costly to the government
by denying it the use of evidence found during such interference,
Mapp helped to promote the freedom of movement for all Americans.
However, Mapp especially promoted the freedom of movement for
African-Americans who were subject to harassment and other unrea-
sonable interference more than most Americans. Terry and its prog-
eny expanded the opportunities for police interference with African-
Americans' freedom of movement. It further expanded police inter-
ference by allowing the area where a stop takes place to be a positive
factor in determining the reasonableness of a stop. This increases the
opportunities for stops in the inner cities, where most people stopped
will be African-Americans or other minorities. While the courts say
"area" alone is not enough, area "alone" is often coupled with other,
innocuous factors. 74 The net result is subjecting people in the inner
cities, most of whom are not and have never been involved in crimi-
nal activity, to constant police interference in their movements in
ways, degrees, and frequency unknown by the rest of America. The
Terry stop, and its expansion, as well as the expansion of unregulated
consensual encounters, has muted Mapp's message, especially on the
streets of inner-city communities where African-Americans continue
to be stopped and hassled by police much more so than in other com-
munities. It is not surprising that the message has been muted. The
Warren Court saw the need to ensure the quality of justice for those in
this country who were denied it. The successor Courts have not been
attuned to this need but, instead, have used their powers to accommo-
date law enforcement convenience by expanding police authority to
intervene without prior judicial authorization and without exigent cir-
cumstances, which traditionally provided the justification for war-
rantless intrusions.75
CONCLUSION
It would be wrong for the reader to conclude that I think that
Mapp after forty years has made little difference in the due process
equation. The rule in Mapp continues to be enforced most fully when
the police intrusion takes place in a home, which is precisely the fact
situation presented in Mapp v. Ohio. The Supreme Court, even the
74 See State v. Bobo, 524 N.E.2d 489, 491 (Ohio 1988) (finding that the high-crime loca-
tion, coupled with such factors as the time of day, the experience of the officers, furtive gestures
by the individual, and the fact that the officers were out of their vehicle, justified the investiga-
tive stop).
75 See Lewis R. Katz, United States v. Ross: Evolving Standards for Warrantless
Searches, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 172, 189 (1983) (discussing the change in the Su-
preme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence holding that police inconvenience did not
justify bypassing the constitutional requirements for searches and seizures).
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post-Warren Court, zealously protects the Fourth Amendment rights
of Americans in their homes, except when it comes to allowing the
prosecution to use evidence secured with an illegal search warrant
that was "reasonably relied upon" by the police.
It is on the streets of America where the message of Mapp has
been muted. Nonetheless, despite the continued lack of equal justice
on the streets and the weakening of the protections of the exclusion-
ary rule, and consequently the weakening of Fourth Amendment
rights outside of the home, Mapp continues to have symbolic effect.
Every time a court rules that reliable and relevant evidence of guilt
must be suppressed, resulting sometimes in the dismissal of charges
against a likely guilty defendant, we are reminded that the cost of
maintaining individual liberties is substantial. Mapp made us con-
front those costs on a regular basis in every court in the land. It
makes us reaffirm our commitment to liberty in a tough, tangible way.
Someday a future Supreme Court-now farther than ever in the
future-must confront the costs to liberty of the dilution of Mapp and
the resulting expansion of police power, especially as a result of the
"war on drugs." Until that day, when our society finally chooses to
admit to and deal with the reality of unequal justice on the streets of
America, the impact of Mapp will remain largely symbolic.
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